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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Abstract 
Disputes are inevitable in any society. This calls for the establishment of disputes mechanisms that 
resolve disputes expeditiously and at affordable rates. The citizens should not be left to despair in 
the pursuit of justice but instead the legal institutions should create an enabling environment that 
enhances the delivery of justice at any forum1. For many years, technicalities were given 
prominence by our courts2. This made it very hard for the applicants in particular and the public 
in general to access justice. Access to justice was merely an appendage to the repealed constitution. 
The courts were reluctant to administer justice due to absence of the rules of procedure. Therefore, 
many litigants were driven away from the seat of justice before their cases could see the light of 
the day. 
The period prior to 2010, when the overriding objective principle and the constitution were 
promulgated, striking out of pleadings for reasons that were purely technical was the rule rather 
than the exception3. In many instances, cases were struck out of the record of the court for trivial 
failure on the part of the applicant to file submissions on time or serve the respondent with the 
applications4. This resulted in untold suffering to the people to the extent that they lost faith in our 
court systems5. The courts were obsessed with technically sound decisions, which according to 
Justice Mutunga, lead to the emergence of mechanical jurisprudence. 
The judiciary had been heavily criticized for its perceived failure to uphold the rule of law6. This 
resulted in lack of confidence in the judiciary. The consequences of lack of confidence in the 
judiciary were evident during the 2007 Post Election Violence,7 where more than a thousand 
                                                          
1 Nguyo P,  ‘Arbitration in Kenya: Facilitating Access to justice by identifying and reducing challenges affecting 
Arbitration’ Unpublished  LLM Thesis, Nairobi University, 2015, 9. 
2 Samuel Wakaba v Bamburi Portland Cement [1997] KLR. During this period, justice was sacrificed on the altar of 
strict adherence to provisions of procedural law which at times created hardship and unfairness. 
3 Augustino Mwai v Okumu Ndede [1995] KLR. 
4 Kibaki v Moi & Others [1998] eKLR. The High court dismissed Kibaki’s presidential petition case on technicality, 
stating that Kibaki should have personally served the president with the election petition challenging the results. The 
Court of Appeal upheld the High Court decision. 
5 Justice Willy Mutunga, “The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and its Interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme Court 
Decisions,’ University of Fort Hare Inaugural Distinguished Lecture Series, October 16, 2014. 
6 The Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board, Determination concerning the judges of the Court of Appeal, 2012 eKLR. 
7 Report of the Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the General Election held in Kenya on 27 December 
2007. The report stated that during the election period in Kenya, a material contributor to the tension at National 
Tallying Centre, broadcast live to the country, was the absence of an effective Electoral Dispute Resolution mechanism 
to resolve the mounting challenges to the integrity of the results from Kibaki Strongholds. The response by the 




people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced8. The public no longer had confidence in 
the judiciary and due to this, judicial reform was identified as one of the areas of focus towards 
restoring the credibility, integrity and independence of the judiciary. 
The judiciary was devoid of the fundamental principles that characterize an effective judiciary. An 
effective judiciary is one that; is accessible, dispenses justice without delay and in accordance to 
law and equity. It protects and promotes the purpose and principles of the constitution9. Justice 
delayed is justice denied; this saying had gained notoriety in our justice system because of the fact 
that it was usual for a case to be determined after about four to six years from the date of 
institution10. 
The power to strike out pleadings, and in the process deprive the party of the opportunity to present 
his case has been held over the years to be a draconian measure which ought to be employed only 
as a last resort and even then only in the clearest of cases11. As a basic right, access to justice 
requires us to look beyond the dry letters of the law. It acts as a reaction to and protect against 
legal formalism and dogmatism12. It has two dimensions; procedural access which entails fair 
hearing before an impartial tribunal and substantive access which is about fair and just remedy for 
a violation of one’s rights. 
The miscarriage of justice prompted the want to cure this variance in the justice system. There was 
the need to give the judiciary a new face. This could only happen if there was an overhaul of the 
entire structure starting with the rules of procedure. There has been gradual steps taken to address 
this problem. The judiciary, through the rules committee has endeavored to simplify and expedite 
the various procedures for approaching the courts contained in different pieces of legislation13. 
                                                          
matters. Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) representatives, adverting to the appointment of five new Judges a 
few days earlier, made plain their distrust of the judiciary and insisted on their challenges being resolved there and 
then, if necessary delaying the announcement of the final result. 
8 The Independent Review Commission (IREC) Report 17 December 2008. 
9 Republic of Kenya, State of the Judiciary Report, 2012-2013. The judiciary has as its mission to deliver justice fairly, 
impartially and expeditiously, promote equal access to justice and advance local jurisprudence by upholding the rule 
of law. 
10Nguyo P,  ‘Arbitration in Kenya: Facilitating Access to justice by identifying and reducing challenges affecting 
Arbitration’ Unpublished  LLM Thesis, Nairobi University, 2015, 3. 
11 Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission& 6 others [2013] eKLR. 
The court ought to be hesitant to strike out pleadings based on technicalities. 
12 Kenya Bus Service Ltd & another v Minister for Transport & 2 others [2012] eKLR. 
13 Section 81, Civil Procedure Act, (Chapter 21 of the laws of Kenya). The committee is mandated to make rules 




The courts procedures have been reenacted to reflect the wishes of the Kenyan people by 
recognizing the overriding objectives of the court is to deliver justice in a fast, affordable, 
expeditious and proportionate manner. 
The enactment of the new constitution in 2010 marked a new beginning14. The constitution came 
in strongly to address these challenges that had faced the judiciary. The general trend, following 
the enactment of the  inter alia section 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 3A and 3B 
of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act and Article 159(2) (d) of the constitution, is that courts today 
strive to sustain rather than to strike out pleadings on purely technical grounds15. 
The reality of this promise shall be brought to fruition only when the courts enforce the 
constitutional and statutory provisions that are critical to the administration of justice. It is 
incumbent upon the courts to develop highly competent and indigenous jurisprudence16 that will 
be trend setting and allow a progressive and a purposive interpretation of the constitution and other 
laws in order to facilitate access to justice for all Kenyans.  
This study examines the extent to which the jurisprudence emanating from our courts have 
strengthened the constitutional provisions on access to justice. It will discuss the prominence that 
the courts are giving or ought to give to substantive justice and not strict adherence to rules of 
procedure. It is the constitutional aspiration that disputes be resolved and settled in a timely manner 
and that justice be dispensed to all. 
 
1.2 Background to the problem 
The constitution provides that it is a fundamental right of every citizen to access justice through 
the courts17. It also establishes the judiciary, as an independent organ tasked with the interpretation 
and dispensation of justice. The courts have to interpret the laws in a manner that gives life to the 
constitutional provisions and promotes its values18. 
                                                          
14 Article 48, Constitution of Kenya (2010). It obligates the state to ensure that the citizen have an access to the courts. 
This access to justice therefore need not be limited by strict adherence to technicalities. Article 159 (2) (d) requires 
courts to dispense justice by abhorring legal technicalities that necessarily hinder the delivery of substantive justice.  
15 Nicholas Kiptoo Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission& 6 others[2013] eKLR 
16 Justice Mutunga W, ‘The Vision of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya,’ keynote Remarks on the occasion of 
celebrating 200 years of Norwegian Constitution University of Nairobi, 19 May 2014. 
17 Article 48, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 




It is therefore a seemingly blatant breach of the constitution and statutory provisions for the court 
to overlook these provisions or otherwise to interpret the same in a manner that is retrogressive 
and which fails to honour the new constitutional philosophy19. 
The right to access justice had been threatened, violated or infringed upon by the courts in the past 
by its failure to abhor legal technicalities20. Today, the right to access justice seem to have 
crystalized after the enactment of the new constitution in Kenya. However, this right can be 
threatened if the courts fail to honour their constitutional mandate of delivering justice without 
being bound by technicalities. Therefore this study appraises the decisions of the courts of record 
in Kenya and critically analyses the impact of dismissal of cases based on legal technicalities on 
substantive justice. 
 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
The 2010 constitution requires courts to dispense justice without being bound by legal 
technicalities. The courts are supposed to guarantee equal protection for all the people’s rights 
enshrined in the constitution. The state has now been given the obligation to ensure justice for all 
unlike in the previous constitution where access to justice was a privilege to many. Whereas this 
study appreciates the intention behind the provisions of articles 48 and 159 (2) (d), it is of the view 
that these provisions might not guarantee enhanced access and dispensation of justice if the courts 
fail to give life and meaning to these provisions through a purposive interpretation. 
The courts, have interpreted these provisions differently and in the exercise of their discretion. 
However, the discretion, ought not to be exercised capriciously but the court has to take into 
account the values and principles enshrined in the constitution. Such interpretation need to promote 
access to justice and not inhibit the same.  
 
 
                                                          
19 Walter Khobe; ‘The Court of Appeal is failing to give effect to Constitutional Aspirations.’ The Platform Legal 
Magazine (2016). The author is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. 
20 Nicholas Kiptoo Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission& 6 others [2013] eKLR. The power to 
strike out pleadings, and in the process deprive a party of the opportunity to present his case has been held over the 





1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The study will be guided by John Rawls’ theory of justice. The theory was put forward in the year 
1971 and it entails the maximization of liberty, equality for all, and fair equal opportunity21. To 
him justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. Being first 
virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising. Rawls was responding to the 
philosophy of utility propounded by Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism espouses the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. According to Rawls, this is an insufficient measurable method 
to direct the governance of society. The individual is an end in himself and so, according to the 
primacy of an individual, he may never be used as a means to the end. 
The theory of Justice was developed from social contract theory to which he generates principles 
of justice for assigning basic rights and duties and determining the division of social benefit in a 
society22. Rawls explains that each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override23. He advocates for the elimination of all 
inequalities of opportunity based on birth or wealth. All in all the idea of justice has a direct link 
with right, equality and entitlement. 
In his theory of justice, he explains the hypothetical case of the veil of ignorance. This is at the 
original agreement in which the social contract is entered into. At this point, no one knows what 
class, race, religion social circumstance, sex would end up after the conclusion of the social 
contract. Therefore, the parties would be inclined to choose a position that advances justice as no 
one knows not where he/she will end up in the society. In his view, these conditions guarantee 
fairness for all prospective members of society in the creation of the principles of justice that will 
order society. On this basis, the research shall aim to realize the ideas expounded by Rawls that 
access to justice is fundamental to our existence and that it has to be guaranteed and protected at 
all cost. 
 
                                                          
21 Freeman M, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, Sweet and Maxwell, 2014, 583. 
22 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice, Havard, USA, 1971, 1-2. 
23 Andrea M, ‘Dismissal of cases on Legal technicalities Versus Substantive Justice: A critical analysis of the Court 




1.5 Literature Review 
The subject on access to justice has been popular among published theories, but few have 
scrutinized the need to abhor legal technicalities in the administration of justice.   
Prior to the promulgation of the constitution of Kenya 2010, the efficiency, independence, integrity 
and public confidence in the judiciary was at its lowest ebb24. The constitution heralded a number 
of progressive reforms in the judiciary. With its full implementation, it is hoped that the judiciary 
will be transformed into an effective, efficient, independent and responsive institution that 
dispenses justice to all in a timely manner. 
It now a well settled principle of law that procedure, is the handmaid of justice and not the mistress 
thereof25. Thus rules of procedure exist to provide a formal channel where justice can be attained 
fairly and without delay26.  However, over time, legal technicalities and strict adherence to the 
rules of procedure have been given prominence by some judges and lawyers27. Strict adherence to 
procedures inhibit the court’s ability in dispensing justice. 
Legal technicalities are strict rules of procedure, points of law or small set of rules as contrasted 
with the intent or purpose of the substantive law. The technicalities ensure strict adherence to the 
letter of the law and may prevent the spirit, intent or purpose of substantive law from being 
enforced28.  
Thomas Aquinas defines justice as the constant and permanent determination to give everyone his 
due. It is the fair and proper administration of the law29. Substantive justice thus means justice 
fairly administered according to the rules of substantive law, regardless of any procedural error 
not affecting the litigant’s substantive right; a fair trial on merit30. 
                                                          
24 Republic of Kenya, Judiciary Perception Survey Presentation, 2012. 
25 Githere v Kimungu (1976-1985) EA 101). The court considered a procedural error or blunder on a point of law and 
noted that, ‘ the relation of rules of practice to the administration of justice is intended to be that of a handmaiden 
rather than a mistress, and that the court should not be bound and tied by the rules, which are intended as general rules 
of procedure, as to be compelled to do that which will cause injustice, this is a particular case, and this a principle in 
which a court must remember when judicially exercising its discretionary powers”.  
26 Re Coles [1907] 1 K.B. 1, 4 Justice Collins M, recognized that the courts are not strictly bound by the rules of 
procedure, which are generally meant to assist the court in delivering justice. They are not compelled to do that which 
will amount to injustice. 
27 Clark E, ‘The Handmaid of Justice’ Washington University Law Quarterly (1938), 297. 
28 Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, west publishing Company, USA (2004), 1234. 
29 Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, (2004), 881. 




The new constitution revamped people’s faith in the judiciary as an organ for the administration 
of justice. The judicial authority is derived from the people31 and therefore the judiciary has the 
mandate of serving the same people by ensuring that the courts are accessible and that justice is 
duly served to all. The constitution guarantees equal protection for everyone. It therefore demands 
that justice must be done to all irrespective of status. 
Lawrence B. Solum has extensively discussed the importance of procedural justice. He 
acknowledges the practice of sacrificing procedural justice on the altar of substantive fairness by 
the courts32. The real work of procedure is to guide. It is said that the regulation of primary conduct 
is the work of the general and abstract norms of substantive law clauses of the constitution, statutes, 
and common law rules of tort, property and contract. But substance cannot effectively guide 
conduct without the aid of procedure. A theory of procedural justice is a theory about the fairness 
of the institutions that administer justice33. The author however has not examined the legal 
technicalities which might hinder access to both procedural justice and substantive justice. 
Thomas Main, argues that substantive law is inherently procedural. He suggests that the 
construction of substantive law entails assumptions about the procedures that will apply when 
substantive law is ultimately enforced. Those procedures are embedded in substantive law and, if 
not applied, will lead to over- or under-enforcement of the substantive mandate34. He posits that 
understanding that procedure is substantive, and that substance is procedural debunks two myths:  
first, that there is a substance-procedure dichotomy, and second, that procedure is the inferior 
partner35.  
Courts, by deciding cases, make law. This is the more rational view of the judicial process. Thomas 
Fitzgerald argues that the legislature and the court perform the same function. The former develops 
general norms of conduct while the latter develops specific and general norms. Specific by 
deciding the rights and duties of the parties to the particular case, general, through the doctrine of 
adherence to precedent. Whereas the legislature has the express power to make laws, the law 
making power of the court is to be exercised cautiously and only in instances where there is a 
                                                          
31 Article 1 (3) c and 159, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
32 Lawrence B, ‘Procedural Justice’ Southern California Law Review, (2004), 139-144. 
33 Lawrence B, ‘Procedural Justice’, 139-144. 
34 Thomas OM, ‘The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law’ Washington University Law Review (2010), 801. 




lacuna in the law. The court interpret the laws in order to determine the rights and duties of the 
disputants. The legislative and general judicial norms is formal. When judge-made law takes the 
shape of rules of court, the difference in form largely disappears. It goes without saying that rules 
of court cannot contravene provisions of constitutions and it has never been doubted that the 
substantive law and the law of jurisdiction are likewise immune to change by court rules. Starting 
with the proposition, which apparently is accepted without question that the rule-making power 
does not extend beyond the field of procedure36. 
Edward Clark agrees with Justice Collins M, that a court cannot conduct its business without a 
code of procedure. He posits that the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended 
to be that of a handmaid rather than mistress. The court ought not to be tied by rules, which are 
only intended to guide it, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case.  
He is however quick to note that such sentiments, when expressed as abstract propositions, will no 
doubt win the assent of all. When applied to concrete cases, there is danger that some judges and 
lawyers will honour it in the breach than in the observance. The court ought to direct its attention 
to the service of justice and only let rules act as a guide towards the attainment of that goal.  
Eric Christiansen37 recognises that South Africa has a transformative constitution, which 
guarantees the protection of human rights. It was the goal of constitutional makers to ensure that 
the constitution has provisions that promote substantive justice. He notes with approval the 
approach taken by the South African constitutional court in advancing substantive justice and the 
use of innovative methods to protect the rights and fundamental freedom of the people. He calls 
this, a ‘justice oriented ideology’38. When countries amend their laws, they seek a superior justice 
than the one previously dispensed with by the former regimes. 
Since the end of apartheid, the courts have been at the forefront of advancing justice in its fuller 
dimensions to all under the guide of the constitution. The constitution declared the new nation to 
be ‘a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights’39. The 
                                                          
36 Thomas Fitzgerald, ‘To what extent may courts under the rule making-power prescribe rules of Evidence?’ 
 American Bar Association Journal, (1940), 482-489. 
37 Christiansen E, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: Creative Uses of Constitutional Court Authority 
to Advance Substantive Justice’, The Journal of Gender, race & Justice (2010), 1-7. 
38 Christiansen E, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa: Creative Uses of Constitutional Court Authority 
to Advance Substantive Justice’, 14. 




author observes that the court’s interest has been to advance substantive justice. It does this through 
its institutional authority. Purposive interpretation and creative application of the court’s 
jurisdiction and remedial authority can advance genuine justice. It is therefore incumbent upon the 
court to apply and put into effect the provisions that saturate the constitution and ensure that there 
is access to justice for all. 
Whereas the study appreciates the existence of constitutional and statutory provisions on access to 
justice and the abhorring of technicalities by the court, it questions their effectiveness to advancing 
the rule of law and the dispensation of justice. It posits that the presence of such provisions is not 
enough to guarantee the advancement of justice. They need to be implemented and adhered to by 
the courts. 
1.6 Research objective 
This study aims to examine the jurisprudence emanating from our courts and analyse whether it 
gives life to the constitutional provisions on access to justice. The objectives are based on the fact 
that judicial officers subscribe to different schools of thought, and that their interpretation and 
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions is influenced by these schools. 
The objectives of this research are: 
i. To demonstrate the enhanced access to justice and an expeditious disposal of court cases 
due to the purposive interpretation of Article 159 (2) (d) of the Constitution. 
ii. To make evident the ramifications that would arise from the otherwise failure to interpret 
the constitution and all statutory provisions in a manner that promotes the expeditious 
access to justice. 
1.6.1 Research questions 
The following questions will be posed and addressed in the course of this research: 
i. How did the former constitution provide for the right to access justice and how did the 
courts’ interprete and apply of the same?  
ii. How should the new constitutional, statutory provisions and the rules made thereunder be 




iii. Are the constitutional safeguards against adherence to technicalities sufficient to guarantee 
access to justice and a fair judicial process? 
 
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
This study suffices the following significance: 
i. The study shows possible solutions to be adopted by judges, magistrates, judicial 
stakeholders and advocates to ensure that justice is not denied on technicality basis. 
ii. The study helps the public at large to understand and access their rights in litigation and 
help them to build confidence to our justice system. 
iii. The study helps the government in law and policy reforms in order to ensure that justice is 





The researcher in this study works under the assumption that: 
1. The mere inclusion of access to justice and the abhorring of legal technicalities by courts 
















This is predominantly a qualitative research that utilized mainly desktop methods to collect both 
primary and secondary information about the study. Primary sources of information are legal 
instruments including the constitution of Kenya, the various statutory provisions that address 
access to justice through our judicial system and Reports of various Taskforces and Commissions. 
The decisions of the superior courts also formed part of the primary source of information for the 
study. Secondary sources of information were also used, the main sources being books, journal 
articles and electronic databases.  
The adopted methodology above limited the research only to the already published materials. This 
led to a generalized conclusion arrived at from the study of a small sample of facts and cases. This 
approach tends to present the findings as precise, narrow and not generalizable. The method chosen 
did not incorporate collection of data on the subject matter.  
The study did not adopt a quantitative research method which includes the use of questionnaire, 
interviews, survey technique and structured observation due to the limited time allocated for the 
research.This study is part of the course work for the requirements for the award of the degree of 
Bachelor of Laws. The study, therefore, has to be conducted and submitted within the prescribed 














CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-2010 ERA AND THE MAIN 
LEGAL PROVISIONS GUIDING THE DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The executive arm of government imposes control on all persons in almost every aspect of life. 
This calls for an independent judiciary to check on the excesses of the other arms of government. 
The citizens must be able to challenge the legitimacy of executive action before an independent 
judiciary. It is from the executive pressure or influence that judges require particularly to be 
protected40.   
Just like many of the former British colonies, Kenya inherited the common law adversarial system 
with its attendant English practice and procedure41. This system has always been at the centre of 
public criticism for contributing to delays in the dispensation of justice together with its attendant 
procedural technicalities42. 
The judiciary in Kenya, had been founded upon the belief that the law emanates from the sovereign 
command. Simply put, law as it is, is the sovereign command43. The Kenya’s jurisprudence 
suggested that the law had to be interpreted literally and that the words in the statutes and the 
constitution were to be given their natural meaning44. This was legal formalism. The approach 
hindered judicial activism45 and the application of reason on technical cases before the courts. 
Legal formalism was the judicial philosophy that had dominated most of our jurisprudential 
inquiry. The mechanical jurisprudence was characterized by formalization of law (law as formal 
                                                          
40 Lord Philip of Worth Matravers, President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court: ‘Judicial Independence and 
Accountability; A view from the Supreme Court’ http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/events/judicial-
independence-events/lord-phillips-transcript.pdg  on 7 December 2016. 
41 J.B. Ojwang, The Common Law, Judges Law: land and Environment before Kenyan Court, Strathmore University 
Press, Nairobi, 2014, 2. 
42 Justice Robert VM, “Breaking the Mould; Addressing the Practical and Legal Challenges of Justice Delivery in 
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rules) and for the most part this traditional idea failed to recognize the idealization of law that is 
law as principles and policies46. 
The judiciary had for long been considered a ‘department’ or the ‘third’ arm of government, 
imputing that it was not equal to the executive or the legislature47. This subordination of the 
judiciary not only undermined its development, but also exposed it to several forces, which led to 
its decline48. According to Montesquieu’s tripartite system, the three arms of government are equal 
and complement each other for a proper functioning state. 
2.2 Jurisprudence emanating from the courts before the Introduction of the Principle of 
Overriding Objective 
Over the years, the judiciary has been accused of historical failure to efficiently, effectively and 
fairly adjudicate over politico-legal disputes49. The role of the judiciary is not confined only to 
resolution of purely legal disputes, but also legal issues of a political nature, such as elections, 
constitutional review and interpretation and enforcement of human rights50. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the courts of law were accused of interpreting the law without regard to the political and 
social realities, as well as the aspirations of the needs of the people. The result was that the courts 
pounced on technicalities to strike out cases and not dispensing justice. 
The judiciary was perceived for many years to have abdicated its role as custodian of the rule of 
law and vanguard of fundamental freedoms. The courts were accused of failing to uphold 
fundamental rights and freedoms, the principle of separation of powers and rule of law in cases 
before them. In a number of cases, the High Court failed to enforce the Bill of Rights, holding that 
the provisions were ‘inoperative’ due to lack of rules contemplated by the constitution51. The court 
ended up becoming a slave of its own rules to the extent that it could not rectify injustices. 
As the custodian of the law, the court, when faced with a situation of competing claims they should 
be guided by the instructive words of Lord Denning: ‘where there is any conflict between the 
freedom of the individual and any other rights or interest then no matter how great or powerful 
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those others may be, the freedom of the humblest citizen shall prevail’.52 The Kenyan courts did 
not heed to that call at that time. 
2.3 The prominence of procedural technicalities in the court system 
It was the rule rather than the exception for the courts to strike out pleadings and sometimes the 
entire suits based on procedural technicalities53. The applicants were strictly supposed to comply 
with the rules of procedure because non-compliance, however slight the mistake, could attract 
severe penalties from the court. The Court of Appeal was on record for striking out appeals if they 
did not satisfy the procedural requirements. One of the rules which led to the striking out of appeals 
was rule 85 of the Court of Appeal rules. This rule was the guiding authority with regard to primary 
documents54.  
The courts are bound to decide cases without undue regard to the technicalities of procedure and 
without undue delay55. This notwithstanding, the position adopted by the court had been very 
different. The courts had on several occasions pounced on technicalities to impede the delivery of 
justice. This was the incident in the case of Chemigas Limited v BOC Kenya Ltd,56 where the 
appellant wrongfully indicated a wrong case number. The court of appeal relied on the mistake 
and struck out the entire appeal on that ground. The court noted that the requirement for the case 
number be included in the title is not futile. The number is the identifying mark of every case and 
its omission or incorrectness is a fundamental defect. This resulted in a miscarriage of justice as 
the court could have otherwise granted the appellant leave to amend and indicate the correct 
number.  
The court arrived at the same findings in Pepco Construction Company Limited v Carter & Sons 
Limited57, where a party named ‘Pepco Construction Company Limited’ was mistakenly described 
in the Notice of Appeal as ‘Pepco Construction & Transport Co Ltd’, the pre-amended name in 
the file. Holding these defects incurable, the court said, these errors are not the sort of errors that 
can be cured under rule 4458. This approach by the court denied the appellant the right to have the 
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matter heard on appeal solely on its advocate’s shortfall of wrongly indicating the name for the 
company. The court ought to have exercised its discretion and interpreted rule 44 in order to allow 
for an amendment to the pleadings. The draconian move by the court resulted in the appellant 
being driven away from the seat of justice before the court could determine the case. 
2.4 Enforcement of the Bill of Rights 
Most constitutional matters involve challenging the exercise of public authority on violations59. 
Litigants pursuing matters against state organs or any other person were likely not to get justice 
from the court except on very few occasions. In some decisions there had been palpable hostility 
towards the liberal interpretation of the constitution60. In some instances the court had been tied to 
the procedure even when doing so would amount to injustice. 
For a long time, courts could not enforce the Bill of Rights. The rights embodied in the Bill were 
dead61 because the Chief Justice had not made procedural rules for their enforcement62. Save for a 
few isolated judgements like the decision in Githunguri v Republic63, the courts adopted an 
unprincipled, inconsistent64 and conservative approach to constitutional interpretation. 
This was the position in the case of Gibson Kamau Kuria v Attorney General65. The applicant who 
had his passport seized by the government through its agents, had requested for the return of the 
same because he wanted to travel outside the country. His request was denied. He made an 
application under section 84 of the constitution saying that the government’s action was contrary 
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to section 81 of the constitution, which guaranteed every individual the right to move freely and, 
therefore, his right to move freely in and out of Kenya. 
The court in dismissing his application stated that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear the matter since 
the Chief Justice had not made rules of practice and procedure as envisaged by the constitution. 
The court accepted to be tied by the technicalities by stating that the absence of the rules affected 
its determination of the said case. It succumbed to the absence of the rules and failed to put the 
interests of justice before the procedures. Being the custodian of justice, the court ought to have 
determined the matter and set precedence henceforth that even in the absence of procedure, its eyes 
are set on justice for all. The court, in that instance missed the historical moment of positioning 
itself as a guardian of the people’s rights. 
In the case of Daniel Arap Moi v Harun Mwau66, the court of Appeal could not decide on matters 
raised as constitutional arguing that the court had no appellate jurisdiction on such matters. Even 
though this rule must have intended to cure some mischief, it fundamentally denied parties their 
right of having their matters determined by the highest court in the land. Constitutional issues 
being fundamental owing to the fact that they touch on the supreme law, must not be made to 
suffer at the preliminary level simply because of a certain technical omission or commission. 
However, in Matiba v Moi & 2 others67, the petitioner filed an election petition at the High Court 
challenging the election of the respondent as the president of Kenya. The petitioner had become 
physically incapacitated sometime prior to the elections and had given his wife the power of 
attorney. He did not personally sign the petition, a technicality that the respondent pounced on 
until the court struck out the petition. The case was dismissed on the grounds that petitioner was 
unable to personally sign the election petition papers.  
The respondent, raised a preliminary objection arguing that the petition was incompetent because 
it had not been signed by petitioner himself as required68. The respondent’s objection was rejected 
and he appealed.  
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The petitioner filed a notice of motion asking the Court of Appeal to strike out the respondent’s 
notice of appeal arguing it did not have jurisdiction69 over decisions made by the Election Court, 
and therefore no appeal lies against the decision of the Election Court. The applicant’s notice of 
motion was dismissed by the court and the notice of appeal was allowed. 
The Court of Appeal argued that signing of the petition by the petitioner’s wife was wrong and 
that the decision of the election court to allow the petition was against rule 4(3) of the Election 
Petition Rules. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck out the petition on the following 
grounds: 
a) The words ‘’signed by the party ‘’ in a statutory provision must be given their natural 
meaning and that it is only that party, in this case Matiba, who must affix his signature in 
the petition. 
b) The words used in the rules were mandatory and did not allow anyone else to sign on behalf 
of the petitioner. 
The decision of the appellate court as noted above was draconian and a violation of the basic 
human rights and the rules of natural justice. Based on the condition of the appellant, he could not 
have signed the petition, something that called for the invocation of the power of attorney to his 
wife. Clearly, the court did not come to the aid of the physically challenged petitioners then and in 
the future by failing to outline how the said petitioners could proceed when filing petitions.  
The case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Attorney General,70 established the principle, that in matters 
concerning enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms, a petitioner must plead with 
particularity that of which he complains, the provision said to be infringed and the manner in which 
the particular right is violated.  
This rule has been criticized and rightly so, for hindering the enforcement of the Bill of Rights and 
the constitution. The efficacy of Bill of Rights was impeded by the rules of constitutional 
interpretation established in Anarita, which makes it difficult if not impossible to enforce the Bill. 
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It had been held that for the court to assume jurisdiction to enforce the Bill, the litigant must specify 
the constitutional provision which has been violated and the manner in which it has been violated71. 
This rule limited the access to justice especially for the poor who could not afford the services of 
an advocate. In such instances, the said person would in mostly fail to outline with clarity the 
provisions of the law they allege to have been violated and the manner of the violation.  
The case laid down an important rule of constitutional adjudication that a person claiming 
constitutional infringement must give sufficient notice of the violation to allow her adversary to 
adequately prepare her case and to save the court from embarrassment of adjudicating on issues 
that are not properly phrased as justiciable controversies. It however failed to qualify its application 
to cases where the petitioner has been represented by an advocate. Strict application of the rule 
meant that cases were dismissed on the basis of not outlining the constitutional provision that has 
been violated. At the end of the day, the court drew its attention on the drafting precision of the 
petitions and not the issues being raised by the petitioners. 
It imperative to note that the courts are the custodian of the law ought to take judicial notice of all 
laws of the land. The rule in Anarita requires mathematical precision in drawing petitions and 
identifying the specific constitutional provision which is alleged to have been violated.  The 
petition should be fashioned in a way that gives proper notice to the respondents about the nature 
of the claims being made so that they can adequately prepare their case. The courts should not be 







                                                          





It clear from the above analysis that the courts paid undue attention to technicalities at the expense 
of justice. As the custodian of the law, the courts failed to advance the rule of law and protect the 
rights of litigants. This resulted in the lack of confidence in the judiciary system. Being the 
decisions of the superior courts, their opinions were binding to all subordinate courts.   
This resulted in the agitation for a new constitution and the reenactment of the rules of procedure 
guiding the courts. It became clear that there was need to expressly state in the laws that the 




















CHAPTER THREE: THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 AND THE 
NEW APPROACH ON THE DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The state is under a constitutional obligation to ensure access to justice for its people72. In fulfilling 
this constitutional mandate, and as one of the tripartite arms of government and the custodian of 
justice, the judiciary is expected inter alia to simplify court procedures so that all litigants can 
understand and effectively participate in court processes.73 
The existence of an independent judiciary is at the heart of a judicial system that guarantees human 
rights in full conformity with constitutional standards. It is the obligation of the state to safeguard 
the independence of the judiciary as an arm of government.74 A trial can only be fair if the judiciary 
itself, and the presiding judge are independent.75 When deciding cases, the court are called upon 
to analyze the facts and the law that pertains to that case and in so doing, exercise their discretion 
judiciously in order to develop our own jurisprudence. 
The courts are at the centre of controversies. The constitution has placed the justice system in the 
public eye on a daily basis.76  They have the tools and resources to adjudicate and determine the 
causes of actions. Therefore, the courts should not fail to honour their call to dispense justice. 
The constitution has removed the doctrine of locus standi.77 Its removal has enhanced the access 
to justice. The application of the doctrine had effectively restricted accessibility of courts, 
prematurely curtailing the right to be heard before the courts. Strict interpretation of this doctrine 
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had seen numerous suits dismissed on preliminary objections rather than on merit.78 Article 2279 
departs from the repealed constitutional approach and it is categorical that, every person has the 
right to institute court proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of 
Rights has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened. 
The constitution at article 22 and 159 embraced a shift towards a liberal & informal approach to 
pleadings. Subject to article 22, the Constitution of Kenya (protection of Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms) Practice and procedure Rules, 2013, were made by the then Chief Justice Willy 
Mutunga. The rules make provision for a simplified procedure in constitutional petitions80. 
Unheard of previously, a court may now accept an informally-filled application, including oral 
applications, letters or any other informal documentation, so long as it discloses the denial, 
violation, infringement or threat to a right or fundamental freedom. In place though, and perhaps 
due to ignorance, petitioners, majority of who are represented, still insist on strict forms of filling 
petitions81. 
Subsequently, the courts in post-2010 dispensation have embraced this transformative vision and 
developed a progressive approach. Pleadings are to be struck out only where they are so imprecise 
that the respondent could not know the case he is facing.  
3.2 The alignment of statutory provisions to the constitution 
Laws have been drafted and/or amended to align with the constitution82. The constitution had set 
the bar, by stating that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities.83 The phrase, ‘undue regard to technicalities has been subject of determination in 
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several court cases, throughout the hierarchical court system.84 The statutes emphasize on the 
cardinal duty of the court to do inherent justice in every case before it.  
The judiciary, through the Rules Committee85, has endeavored to simplify the various procedures 
for approaching the court contained in different pieces of legislation. The Chief Justice gazetted 
various rules and practice directions aimed at streamlining the process. These include the Supreme 
Court Presidential Election Petitions Rules86, the Supreme Court Rules87, the Sexual Offences 
Rules88, the Court of Appeal Rules89, the Civil Procedure Rules90, and the Criminal Procedure 
Code.91 
Justice Ojwang’ JB, in Luka Kitumbi and 8 others v Commissioner of Mines and Geology and 
another92, observed that a new obligation is placed upon the judge, who, though beginning from 
the established judicial practice and known principles of interpretation, must assess any cause 
coming up before him or her in relation to the imperative terms of the new constitution. He 
noted that the court must rethink the relationship between the old statute law and the requirement 
of the new constitution. Judges are no longer judicial robots, mechanically deciding cases and 
dismissing them on technical grounds93. They are called upon to exercise their minds taking all 
factors into consideration when presiding and deciding over a matter. This will spearhead the 
development of our indigenous jurisprudence and the dispensation of justice.  
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The overriding objectives94 under the Civil Procedure Act95 and the corresponding sections 3A 
and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act96 now emphasize on just, expeditious, proportionate and 
affordable resolution of disputes as the overriding objective.97 These principle are similar to what 
is contained in the Civil Procedure Rules of 1998 in England. 
The Woolf reforms of 1998, introduced the overriding objective provisions by way of Civil 
Procedure Rules in England. In case of Biguzzi v Bank Leisure98 in which Lord Woolf himself 
talked about the concept of overriding objective that ‘under the Civil Procedure Rules, the position 
is fundamentally different. As rule 1.1 makes clear the rules is a new procedural code with the 
overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly. The problem with the position 
prior to the introduction of the rules was that often the court had to take draconian steps such as 
striking out the proceedings.’ The principle is made of two terminologies; overriding defined as 
taking precedence and objective refers to something that one’s effort is intended to attain or 
accomplish. Therefore what takes precedence in the courts’ undertaking should be the intention to 
dispense justice. 
3.3 The rationale behind the Introduction of Overriding Objective Principle 
The enactment of the overriding objective has be seen to settle the long running contest in Kenyan 
jurisprudence between form and substance. The principle clearly directs the court to follow the 
latter. In the case of Philip Chemwolo & another v Augustine Kubende99, the Court of Appeal held 
that the primary concern of the court is to do justice. 
The overriding objective principle was introduced in Kenya following the legal atrocities that, for 
far too long, had been perpetrated by the judges. It was brought into place to cure the problem of 
dismissal of cases based on procedural technicalities. When parties approach the court with a 
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dispute, they do so acknowledging the fact that the court is the proper forum for amicable dispute 
resolution based on the laws of the land100. The aspiration of the litigants is that they will always 
have the courts as a resort for the enforcement and protection of their rights. Therefore, when cases 
were dismissed on technicalities of procedure, the litigant were driven from the judgement seat 
before their complaint were investigated.101 As the custodian of the law, it is incumbent upon the 
court to ensure at all times that justice is served to all who come before it. 
As a matter of fact, the civil procedure and the rules made thereunder are meant to aid the court 
deliver justice to the litigants and not meant to obstruct the course of justice. This is why the rules 
have been referred to as hand maiden of justice, not a mistress thereof102. The rules of procedure 
are put in place to enable the court conduct the case in a proper manner, they are not, at all 
circumstances to be seen as a hindrance or an obstruction to the course of justice103. 
3.4 Courts active role in furthering substantive justice 
It is now a settled point of law that courts have to consider and be aware of the oxygen principle 
in the determination of cases before them. In Kamani v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission,104 
Kamani, the respondent in the appeal, had applied for the appeal to be struck out on a technicality. 
He raised an objection that some primary documents, including the hand-written notes of two trial 
judges, had been omitted from the appeal record. He therefore argued that the appeal was invalid 
and should be struck out. 
Before the amendments105, the court had consistently ruled that the omission of primary documents 
in the appeal record was fatal to an appeal, which would have to be struck out as a result. However, 
the court considered the new amendments which introduced the oxygen principle.  
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The court went on to consider what was likely to happen if it proceeded to strike out the appeal, 
and found that the common experience was that whenever an appeal was struck out, the appellant 
would invariably seek leave to file a fresh appeal. This would lead to an increase in the cost 
pertaining to litigation, as well as a waste of judicial time and resources. The court found that this 
wrong must be what parliament intended to remedy by making the amendments. The court 
therefore found that the approach that it must now take was not to strike out the appeal 
automatically, but first examine whether the striking out will be in line with the oxygen principle. 
The court therefore declined to strike out the appeal, and granted the appellant leave to file a 
supplementary record of appeal to include the omitted documents. 
In Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 others,106 the High Court 
pointed out that the rule Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic107 was decided under the old constitution. 
The court noted that it was upon the court to bring the said decision into consonance with the 
provision of the new constitution on access to justice and the framing of constitutional pleadings. 
It was the court’s position that, with regard to the admissibility of petitions seeking to enforce the 
constitution, it must not be at the epitome of drafting precision. The courts, while exercising 
judicial authority pursuant to article 159 of the constitution, must abhor procedural technicalities 
and in this case, requiring extreme clarity in framing constitutional issues amounted to procedural 
technicalities.   
It must be noted that the above High Court decision did not purport to overrule Anarita Karimi 
Njeru as it laid down an important rule of constitutional adjudication. A person claiming 
constitutional infringement must give sufficient notice of the violation to allow her adversary to 
adequately prepare and save the court the embarrassment of adjudicating on issues that are not 
appropriately phrased as justiciable controversies. However, the court was of the opinion that the 
proper test under the new constitution is whether a petition as stated raises issues that are so 
attenuated that a court of law properly directing itself to the issue cannot fashion an appropriate 
remedy due to the inability to concretely fathom the constitutional violation alleged. 
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In Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers &3 others108, the trial judge 
had assumed a much active role as a ‘facilitator’ to engineer resolution of a protracted dispute. The 
judge directed the matter to proceed under section 15 of the Industrial Court Act which provide 
for alternative dispute resolutions. This was a step in the right direction as the court caught grip of 
the matter and ended up amicably deciding the dispute. It must be noted as earlier pointed out that 
such move by the trial judge is what Willy Mutunga referred to as the development of competent 
and indigenous jurisprudence. This approach breaks away from the norm and is not tied in any 
way by the limited traditional remedies provided for by the law. It allows the judge to be creative 
and apply his mind within the four corners of the law and come up with a remedy that is tailored 
towards a particular dispute. 
In the case of Uchumi Services Limited v Chengo Katana Koi & 4 others109 the applicant sought 
to have the defendant’s defence and counter claim filled by an unqualified person110 to act as an 
advocate struck out as they cannot stand having been drawn by a non-existent firm of Advocates. 
The court in its findings, struck out the defence and the counter-claim for having been drawn by 
an unqualified person but was quick to point out that that will result in an injustice on the part of 
the defendant. The court noted that it is the right of everyone to access the justice and have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair and public hearing 
before a court.  
The court was of the view that in as much as it has found in favour of the applicant, justice would 
be served if only it exercises its inherent jurisdiction under section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act 
to allow such a party to file a valid pleadings. The court looked beyond the dry letters of the law 
and exercised its powers by provided a remedy that serves the purpose of advancing justice.  
                                                          
108 [2015] eKLR.  
109 [2008] eKLR. 
110 Section 2, Advocates Act defines the term ‘unqualified person’ as a person not qualified under Section 9 as an 
advocate. Section 9 of the Act provides as follows: 
Subject to this Act, no person shall be qualified to act as an advocate unless; 
a) He has been admitted as an advocate; and 
b) His name is for the time being on the Roll; and 
c) He has I force a practising certificate and for the purpose of this Act a practicing certificate shall be deemed 




In the case of Mechanical Engineering Plant & 2 others v Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd111 
the court dealt with an application for extension of time to file a record of appeal which had been 
struck out for having been drawn by an unqualified advocate as follows: ‘It is now well settled that 
a party whose appeal has been struck out as being incompetent may apply for an extension of time 




The amendments have ushered in a new era of case management, aimed at achieving the just and 
expeditious determination of disputes, while ensuring the efficient use of judicial resources. The 
trend nowadays if for the courts to strive to maintain pleadings rather than to strike them out. 
However, the amendments should not be viewed as a magic cure to any situation. As was rightly 
noted in Kamani’s case, the court warned that a litigant who takes six months to file a notice of 
appeal which ordinarily should be done within 14 days of the decision cannot simply rely on the 
oxygen principle. Indeed, the overriding objective is not meant to help the indolent but to ensure 
inherent justice is served to all. It should not be applied to cause delay or obstruction of justice. It 
must be taken as a double edged sword meant to facilitate justice while at the same time eliminating 
further obstruction and delay of justice by lazy litigants.112 
The court must strive to, as much as possible, deliver substantive justice. In doing so, the judge 
must caution himself on the utility of the rules of procedure in litigation. The rules of procedure 
are very critical in the court proceedings as they guide the court on how to approach a dispute. The 
court must not depart from the procedural rules unless it is absolutely necessary in serving the ends 
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CHAPTER FOUR: NEW WINE IN THE OLD WINE SKINS: THE 
CHALLENGE OF REALIZING EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE 
WAKE OF A CONTINUED RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONAL 
APPROACH BY THE COURT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The dream and aspirations of the people of Kenya as enunciated in the constitution of having an 
effective judiciary, one that abhors procedural technicalities and dispenses justice might remain as 
aspirations if the courts fail to honour the call to dispense justice. The judiciary occupies a vantage 
point in not only living by the set values and principles but also in promoting and protecting them. 
However, there are instances where the judiciary has failed to capitalize on its position as the 
custodian of the law and further the interest of justice. 
The courts are duty bound to compare the professed ideals and principles contained in the 2010 
constitution and its core values with legal doctrines and concepts as they had been developed until 
the passing of the constitution113. This demands a conceptual legal change in order to facilitate the 
emergence of the new state envisaged by the constitution. The constitution demands the 
establishment of a society based on the essential values of human  rights,  equality,  democracy,  
social  justice and  the  rule of  law’114. 
The constitution embodies the idea that Kenya seeks to be a democratic, egalitarian and 
accountable state115. This calls for full implementation of the constitution by allowing its entry into 
all spheres of the legal system to effect the intended changes116. It is not always that the courts will 
give life and proper interpretation to the constitutional provisions. The courts are called upon to 
always give effect to the imperative transformation but sometimes can fail to do117. 
                                                          
113 Justice J.B. Ojwang’ in Luka Kitumbi and 8 others v Commissioner of Mines and Geology and Another [2010] 
eKLR. 
114 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, the Preamble. 
115 Walter Khobe, ‘The Court of Appeal is failing to give effect to Constitutional Aspirations.’ The Platform Legal 
Magazine 2016. The author is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya. 
116 Walter Khobe, ‘The Court of Appeal is failing to give effect to Constitutional Aspirations.’ The Platform Legal 
Magazine 2016. 
117 The judges exercise their judicial discretion and independence when deciding cases before them. However, if they 
do so capriciously without taking into account the legal doctrines and the social, economic and political realities of 




Kenya’s legal culture and the approach of law is steeped in the legalistic approach to law as this is 
the way Kenyan lawyers, law scholars and judges have been trained and have traditionally 
approached law118.  The courts, often operating under the influence of the legal culture of the 
rejected past, can prove to be the stumbling block to the imperative change.  However, the 
constitution119 demands a break from the chain of this legalistic mentality. Judges should go 
beyond the traditional notion of adjudication associated with the liberal legalism and embrace non-
traditional approaches to resolution of disputes. 
4.2 The re-awakening of the rejected past 
The courts have not hesitated on several occasions to pronounce themselves in a rather 
retrogressive manner, thus reviving the old constitutional legacy. The Court of Appeal in Mumo 
Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others120, threw out the gains and 
admirable approach the High Court had developed in the area of our jurisprudence and re-
introduced the principle of Anarita Karimi Njeru121 and its mechanical application ignoring the 
dictates of the constitution.  
The court, in deciding the case, stated that the principle in Anarita underscores the importance of 
defining the dispute to be decided by the court. It further said that it was a misconception to claim 
that compliance with rules of procedure is adversative to article 159 of the constitution and the 
overriding objective principle under section 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act and section 3A 
and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. It observed the importance of procedure as a handmaiden 
of just determination of cases. On pleadings, the court noted that cases cannot be dealt with justly 
unless the parties and the court know the issues in controversy and that pleadings assist in that 
regard. Therefore, the court noted that the principle in Anarita that established the rule that requires 
reasonable precision in framing of issues in constitutional petitions as a principle of substantive 
justice122. 
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Based on the above approach, it is difficult to ascertain what the court would say on the rights-
driven boldness, which includes embracing epistolary jurisdiction in India123 and tutela action in 
Colombia124, approaches that have been celebrated and hailed across the globe. The judges in these 
countries did not have the aid of clear constitutional provisions like our article 22 and 159125, but 
by eschewing formalism, those judges have revolutionized constitutional litigations in their 
jurisdictions126. In the new dispensation, form is supposed to give way to substance; obsession 
about form is a betrayal of the transformative vision of the constitution127. The constitution 
demands procedural flexibility thus courts should use this permission for radical procedural 
innovation that is valuable in expanding access to courts128. The constitution embodies a hope that 
the permission granted by the constitution would see courts taking a wide range of non-traditional 
steps to accept informally-drafted petitions, discharge the evidentiary burden where parties cannot, 
and seek to develop non-traditional innovative remedies129. 
In Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 3 others130, the Court of 
Appeal was faced with a situation where the trial Court had proceeded in a manner that breaks 
away from the traditional passive role of a judge in resolving a complex teachers’ pay dispute. The 
judge had acted as a ‘facilitator’ to engineer resolution of a protracted dispute. One of the questions 
before the court was that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction when he directed the matter to proceed 
                                                          
123 Epistolary Jurisdiction extended by the apex court of India is one of the most significant procedural innovations to 
secure justice for all. Encouraging letter petitions is based on the idea of easy and effective access to all without any 
procedural burden. 
124 Patrick Delaney, ‘Legislating for Equality in Colombia: Constitutional Jurisprudence, Tutelas and Social Reforms’ 
The Equal Rights Review (2008). Columbia is said to be home of progressive constitutional system, the product of a 
relatively recent constitution. Tutela is a mechanism for the protection of equality in Colombia, which is an easily 
accessible and quickly resolved writ for the satisfaction of fundamental rights. As such, it has become a popular 
mechanism for ordinary Colombian citizens to claim their constitutionally protected rights has been violated. 
125 Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
126 Justice A.F.M. Rahman Bangladesh Supreme Court, in his article,” Upholding Human Rights of the Poor: 
Epistolary Jurisdiction Could be Instrumental”, discusses the progressive steps taken by the supreme court in 
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Magazine 2016. 
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under section 15 of the Industrial Court Act131 which provide for alternative dispute resolutions. 
Counsels for the appellants contested on whether the judge had jurisdiction to conduct conciliation 
proceeding and adjudication at the same time. The appellants argued that alternative dispute 
resolution denotes a proceeding that is outside of the court and could not be conducted by a judge. 
The court of Appeal adopted a legalistic approach and held that the proceedings before the trial 
court were a nullity. It held unanimously that, ‘as a general principle, a judge of the Employment 
and labour Relations Court has no jurisdiction to conduct conciliation under section 15 of the 
Industrial Court Act as read with article 159(2) (c) of the constitution. The constitution allows 
judges to curve the niche for themselves as mediators and facilitators in the resolution of disputes. 
This legalistic approach means that judges cannot go out of their way and develop innovative 
solutions to problems facing society provided the said remedy is in line with the aspirations of the 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The new constitution has revolutionized litigation and access to justice in Kenya. Indeed, the clear 
constitutional provisions that facilitate the expeditious resolution of disputes by the courts and the 
various statutory provisions have proved adequate in positioning the judiciary as an able arbiter in 
the disputes that arise in this country. 
However, these legal provisions shall not see the light of the day if the courts fail to actualize them 
through a purposive interpretation that is in line with the wishes of the people of Kenya. The courts 
have demonstrated their ability and willingness to abide by these provisions and ensure that the 
ultimate goal of substantive justice is achieved.  
5.2 Procedural Justice versus Substantive Justice 
The study notes the need to strike a balance between procedural justice and substantive justice. 
Procedure ensures that substantive justice is achieved. In this regard, not a single one of them exists 
in isolation. Procedural justice is of great importance in the dispensation of justice and the court 
should not be quick to sacrifice procedural justice on the altar of substantive fairness.  
A judge must always direct his mind towards the attainment of justice. He must strive to deliver 
substantive justice. In doing so, the judge must caution himself on the utility of the rules of 
procedure in litigation. The courts are to adhere to the procedural rules at all times unless doing so 
would result in an injustice. The overriding objective principle is meant to facilitate the expeditious 
delivery of justice. At no point in time should it be applied to cause delay and miscarriage of 
justice, as it well known that justice delayed is justice denied. It must be taken as a double edged 
sword meant to facilitate justice while at the same time eliminating further obstruction and delay 
of justice by lazy litigants. 
The above success has not been without challenges. There has been instances where the courts 
have failed to give life to these provisions. These isolated instances need not take the centre stage 
of our progression as they are likely to dissuade us from our main goal and aim of furthering 
substantive justice. 
With the enhanced constitutional access to courts, we need to caution ourselves against the 
tendency of rushing directly to court without firstly exhausting other possible avenues of dispute 




justice system. The court should be the last resort in many instances unless grave injustice is likely 
to occur if the court’s intervention is not sought early enough.  
Where there is a remedy in civil law then parties should pursue that remedy. It is important to note 
that not all ills in society should attract a constitutional sanction. Constitutional sanctions should 
be reserved for appropriate and really serious occasions.  It is impermissible to directly rely on 
fundamental rights as contained in the constitution when the right in issue is regulated by 
legislation. A litigant should not be seen to by-pass the legislations guiding a particular dispute. 
When a legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant cannot by pass the 
legislation and rely directly on the constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short 
of the constitutional standard. 
An important element of the concept of access to justice is the need not to clog the judicial system 
by lodging frivolous claims, as this amounts to waste of the court’s time and resources. Therefore, 
litigants should only institute proceedings that are justiciable and based on a particular set of laws 
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